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The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial:
Some Constraints
DR. OMER

Y. ELAGAB*

I. The Purpose
Seven years have passed since warrants were issued for the arrest of the two Libyan
nationals accused of the Lockerbie bombing. Since that date, the parties concerned have
not been able to agree on a venue for conducting the trial. By all accounts, there has never
been any reasonable prospect of the two accused being handed over for trial in Scotland or
the United States.'
British and American authorities agreed in August 1998 to hold the trial in the Netherlands, bearing in mind that such a proposal has, at all times, been suggested by Libyan
authorities. Saudi Arabian and South African mediators issued statements on February 15,
1998, suggesting that a deal to hand over the accused for trial in the Netherlands is imminent.
This article traces the factual background to the Lockerbie case. It then proceeds to set
out the respective Libyan and British initiatives pertaining to the choice of venue. This
discussion is followed by an appraisal of extraditing the accused under the Montreal Convention of 1971. The article then explores the possibility of forfeiting the option not to
extradite due to the complicity of the state in the terrorists' acts. Finally, it examines whether
human rights norms create an independent bar to the extradition. This article will not
examine the legality of the Security Council Resolutions as pertains to the extradition of
the two accused, nor will it analyze the wrongfulness otherwise of the sanctions imposed
against Libya.'
*Dr. Omer Y. Elagab, is D. Phil (OxQn), Reader in Law, City University, London.
1. Robert Black, The Lockerbie Proposal, SCOTS L. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at 304; Lord Hardie, Lord
Advocate of Scotland, The Lockerhie Trial, SCOTS L. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at 9; see also Foreign Secretary Robin

Cook, Statement on Lockerbie (Aug. 24, 1998); Lord Hardie, Lord Advocate of Scotland, Statement on Lockerbie (Aug. 24, 1998).
2. See generally Sami Shubber, The Destruction ofAircraft in Flight over Scotlandand Niger: The Questionsof
Jurisdictionand Extradition UnderInternationalLaw, 1995 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 239; Fiona Beveridge, The Lockerbie
Affair, 41 Isrr'L & COMp. L.Q. 907 (1992); Marc Weller, The Lockerhie Case:A PrematureEnd to the "New World
Order,"4J. AFR. Soc'Y INT'L & COMp. L. 302 (1992); The Department of Transport, Air Accidents Investigation
Branch, Report on the Accident to Boeing 747-121, N739 PA at Lockerbie Dumfrieshire, Scotland on 21 December
1988, 1990 H.M.S.O. (London) 3. See also Determination by Sheriff Principal J S Mowat QC in the Fatal
Accident Inquiry Relating to the Lockerbie Air Disaster 14-16 (Oct. 1, 1990 to Feb. 13, 1991).
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H. Factual Background
On December 21, 1988, at about three minutes past 7:00 P.M., a bomb hidden in aToshiba
radio-cassette player exploded in the New York-bound Pan Am Flight 103, some 31,000
feet over Lockerbie, Scotland. It took four minutes for the broken aircraft to hit the ground,
spreading wreckage across the rolling farmland that surrounds Lockerbie. All 259 passengers and crew were killed, as were eleven residents of Lockerbie. Two-thirds of the victims
were Americans, and forty-four were British. In addition, nationals of twenty other countries were killed. Twenty of the victims were children.'
After considering evidence allegedly gathered during the largest criminal investigation
in the history of Britain, the Lord Advocate, Scotland's Chief Law Officer, issued on November 14, 1991, warrants for the arrest of two Libyan nationals: Abdel Basset Ali alMegrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. These men were accused of having placed, or having
caused to be placed, a bomb on board the aircraft, conspiracy to murder and other various
4
offenses under the Aviation and Security Act of 1982.
At the same time, the United States' Acting Attorney General issued warrants for the
arrest of the two Libyan suspects. Thus, indictments were preferred before a grand jury of
the District Court for the District of Columbia, charging the two men with the murder of
188 U.S. nationals and several other offenses relating to the destruction of aircraft by means
of an explosive device.'
On November 27, 1991, the British and U.S. governments issued a joint statement calling
upon the Libyan government not only to surrender the two accused for trial, but also to
accept complete responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials, disclose all it knew of the
crime, including the names of all those responsible, allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other material evidence, including all the remaining timers, and pay appropriate
compensation.'
On the same day, the U.K., U.S. and French governments issued another joint statement
recalling the British and American demands related to the Lockerbie incident and adding
separate demands by France in connection with the bombing of a UTA aircraft on September 19, 1989, which claimed 171 lives.' This latter statement called on Libya to cease all
forms of terrorism and all assistance to terrorist groups, and, by concrete actions, to prove
its renunciation of terrorism.
Although Libyan authorities issued a statement asserting readiness to cooperate fully with
competent British and American authorities, both the U.K. and U.S. governments were of
the view that the Libyan action was not an adequate response to the two joint statements.'

3. G. Joffe, Sanctions in the Mediterranean with Special Reference to Libya's Conference Paper on Politics of
Sanctions, 1995 INST. WORLD AtF. 4; see also the document released by the U.S. Department of the Air Force
(Air Intelligence Agency) dated Nov. 17, 1994.
4. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/23307 (1991) [hereinafter U.K. Letter].
5. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of France, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23306
(1991).
6. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14) [hereinafter Lockerbie]; Letter
from the Permanent Representative of the United States, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23308 (1991).
7. U.K. Letter, supra note 4.
8. Lockerbie, supra note 6.
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In a similar vein, little attention was given to another Libyan move that called for resort to
arbitration under article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention of 1971.
On January 21, 1992, the three European powers concerned took the matter to the
Security Council. The latter adopted Resolution 731, calling upon Libya to provide a full
and effective response to the requests made earlier in the joint declarations.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992, Libya took the dispute to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), requesting provisional measures to prevent action by the Security Council
compelling it to surrender the accused for trial in British or American courts. The court,
however, did not accede to their request.
When the three European powers decided that Libya had not cooperated fully in their
investigations regarding the Lockerbie and UTA bombings, as required by Resolution 731,
they took the matter back to the Security Council. This move led to the imposition of
sanctions against Libya under Resolution 748 on March 31, 1992. The sanctions were
subsequently strengthened by Security Council Resolution 833 of November 11, 1993. The
key elements of these sanctions are:
* an arms embargo and prohibition of any military assistance;
* a reduction in the level of diplomatic relations;
* prohibition of the operations of the Libyan Arab Airlines;
* prohibition of flights to and from Libya;
* an embargo on aircraft parts and services;
* freezing of Libyan assets (except those arising from oil sales); and
* an embargo on certain types of equipment for the oil sector (equipment that would
allow expansion).
In order for these sanctions to be lifted, Libya is obliged to cooperate with the Lockerbie
and UTA investigations (which in the case of Lockerbie specifically includes the surrender
of the accused to the United Kingdom or the United States) and the renunciation of terrorism.
For its part, Libya has responded by providing some cooperation with the French investigation into the UTA bombing. Consequently, France has declared itself broadly satisfied with that cooperation, and the trial in absentia of the six Libyans accused that was
scheduled to take place before the end of last year has not taken place. 9
Libya has also provided some information about the significant material and financial
help that it had given to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. The British government
stated, on November 20, 1995, that while gaps and omissions remained in that information,
Britain was satisfied that they largely met its expectations and acknowledged this as a step
towards renunciation by Libya of terrorism. 0
Be that as it may, Britain and the United States continue to believe that the most convincing way in which Libya could show that it has renounced terrorism would be to deliver
for trial those accused in the Lockerbie bombing.
On March 3, 1992, Libya took the case to the ICJ, where it argued that there was no
extradition treaty between itself and the United Kingdom and the United States. It further
asserted that it was entitled under the Montreal Convention to assume criminal jurisdiction

9. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Statement on Lockerbie (Aug. 24, 1998).
10. Id.
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and to prosecute the accused. A request by Libya for provisional measures to prevent further
action by the U.K. and U.S. governments, including action in the Security Council to
compel it to surrender the accused, was not ordered by the court.
H1. The Seat of the Trial
A.

THE LIBYAN INITIATIVES

As has been mentioned, Libya wanted to conduct the trial on Libyan soil, but that was
summarily dismissed by both the U.K. and U.S. governments."
After that, Libya took several initiatives, directly or indirectly or in consultation with
other states, in its endeavors to find a solution that would meet the requirements of Security
Council Resolution 731. Thus, in consultation with Libya, Tunisia proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, that the two suspects be interrogated and tried in France, on the basis that France
was one of the sponsors of the three main Security Council Resolutions regarding the
Lockerbie case. A further proposal was made by Egypt, in consultation with Libya, for the
trial to be held in a third country or at the headquarters of the ICJ in The Hague by a
Scottish court applying Scottish law. The three European powers did not bother to reply
to that proposal.'
Libya has subsequently subscribed to a proposal of the League of Arab States that the
two suspects should be tried in the Netherlands by Scottish judges and in accordance with
Scottish law. This was in line with one of the three formulae submitted jointly by the League
of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity. It is noteworthy that this proposal
was endorsed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of NonAligned Countries. 3
Although Libya has repeatedly accepted trial of the suspects according to Scottish law, it
balked at the prospect that the accused, if convicted, would be imprisoned in Scotland.
According to media reports following Saudi Arabian and South African mediation, that
issue has been resolved to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned. The hand-over of
4
the accused for trial in the Netherlands seems closer than ever.'
B.

THE BRITISH INITIATIVE

Since early 1998, Britain has been in close contact with the United States and the Netherlands in order to bring the two accused for trial in the Netherlands. Prior to that, the
U.K. government discussed with the U.S. government whether they could break the stale-

11. Letter from the Permanent Representative of Libya to the U.N. President of the Security Council

(Jan. 2, 1998).
12. Id.
13. See generally Communications of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the
Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1994/373 (1994);
U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/834 (1995); U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1997/834(1997);
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1997/35 (1997); U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/273 (1997);
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/406 (1997); U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/497 (1997);
U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1997/529 (1997) (regarding the resolutions submitted by the United
Kingdom and the United States).
14. Press Association bulletin dated Feb. 13, 1999; Foreign Secretary Statement on Lockerbie (Feb. 13,
1999).
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mate by arranging a trial in a third country. This section explains how the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have proceeded in that direction.
1. The Anglo-American Letter ofAugust 24, 1998, to the U.N. Secretary General
A letter dated August 24, 1998, was sent from the Acting Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom and the United States to the Secretary General of the United
Nations. 5 Profound concern was expressed in that letter, as Libya had failed to ensure the
appearance of the two accused for trial in the appropriate U.K. or U.S. court, in spite of
the assurances given to the fairness of a trial in these jurisdictions, the report of the indeby the U.K. government to accommodate interpendent legal experts, and the offer made
6
national observers at a Scottish trial.'
The two representatives stated that their governments were prepared, as an exceptional
measure, to arrange for the two accused to be tried before a Scottish court sitting in the
Netherlands. Further, the Dutch government was approached and it responded positively
to the Anglo-American request that the Lockerbie trial be held in the Netherlands. It was
stressed in the letter that the proposed court would be a Scottish court and would follow
normal Scottish law and procedures in every respect except for the replacement of the jury
by a panel of three Scottish High Court judges. Furthermore, the Scottish rules of evidence
and procedure, and all the guarantees of fair trial provided by the law of Scotland, would
apply.
The joint letter goes on to state that international observers would be permitted to attend
the trial. Also, that the two accused would have safe passage from Libya to the Netherlands
and that while they are there, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States would
seek their transfer to any jurisdiction other than the Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. If found guilty, however, the two accused would serve their sentence in Scotland, but
if acquitted, they would have safe passage back to Libya.
More significantly, the joint letter provides that should other crimes committed prior to
arriving in the Netherlands become known in the course of the proceedings, neither of the
two accused nor any of the witnesses will be detained while in the Netherlands for the
purpose of giving evidence at the trial.
Finally, the joint letter refers to the text of an agreement to be entered into by the
governments of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This article will show that there
are serious contradictions between the two documents.
Some of the issues raised in the joint letter will be discussed in the part of this article
that deals with the agreement between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands concerning a Scottish trial in the Netherlands. For now, however, we intend to focus on the desirability of replacing the jury by three Scottish High Court judges who will decide questions
of fact and law.
A trial before an international panel of jurists (including Scottish judges) has been suggested by the present writer and by Professor Robert Black.' 7 This panel could operate
under Scottish law and would be able to receive guidance from experts on the relevant

15. Letter from Ambassador Gomersall for the U.K. and Ambassador Burleigh for the U.S. to the U.N.
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/795 (1998).
16. Letter dated 18 December, 1997 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1997/991 (1997).
17. See Black, supra note 1.
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Scottish laws. It is somewhat surprising that the Lord Advocate of Scotland thought that
the result of such a scheme would be a travesty of a jury. It is common knowledge that
superior British courts time and again apply foreign laws to cases before them that have a
foreign element. In so doing, they rely in the first place on evidence given by experts as to
the applicable law (or the proper law as is sometimes known). This method could also be
invoked in the Lockerbie case.
The writer strongly believes that an exclusively Scottish court will not do, as the judges
would be unable to judge the facts because their legal training does not cover that.
2. Security Council Resolution Dated August 27, 1998
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council
passed a resolution ratifying the contents of the letter dated August 24, 1998, from
the Acting Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to
the Secretary General. The resolution also noted the terms of the agreement between the
United Kingdom and the Netherlands regarding the Lockerbie trial in The Hague.
The Security Council reiterated its demands that the Libyan government should comply
with Resolutions 731, 738 and 883. In addition, it welcomed the initiative for the trial of
the two accused before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. Moreover, it called upon
the Dutch and the British governments to conclude an agreement between themselves to
facilitate the trial in The Hague.
3. The Agreement Between the U.K and the Netherlands Governments Concerninga Scottish
Trialin the Netherlands
This agreement, consisting of twenty-nine articles, purports to regulate the sitting of the
Scottish court in the Netherlands and the matters arising out of the trial and the proper
functioning of that court.
In dealing with the jurisdiction of the court, article 3 authorizes the detention of the
accused for the purposes of the trial and, in the event of conviction, pending their transfer
to the United Kingdom. In a very curious way, the same article empowers the Scottish court
to order (a) the temporary detention of witnesses transferred in custody to the premises of
the Scottish courts and (b) the temporary detention of witnesses in the course of their
evidence.
The writer finds this provision to be inconsistent with article 17(5) of the agreement and
the substance of the joint letter of August 24, 1998, which provides:
should other offenses committed prior to arrival in The Netherlands come to light during the
course of the trial, neither of the two accused nor any other person attending the court, including witnesses, will be liable for arrest for such offenses while in The Netherlands for the
purpose of the trial.
It is not clear whether article 3(9) of the agreement should prevail over article 17(5) and
the content of the joint letter cited above. The apparent confusion is likely to cause doubt
in the minds of the potential witnesses. As a result, it is almost certain that some key
witnesses may refrain from attending the trial for fear of being detained.
More significantly, however, is article 13(2), which considers the possibility of transferring
the accused from the premises of the Scottish court in The Hague directly to the territory
of the United Kingdom:
(a) for the purpose of trial by jury in Scotland, provided that the accused have given their
written agreement, and have confirmed that agreement in person to the High Court
of Justiciary in the presence of any counsel instructed by them, or
VOL. 34, NO. 1
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(b) for the purpose of serving a custodial sentence imposed by the Scottish court following the conviction of the accused.
Leaving aside the issue of the place where custodial sentence may be served by the accused
if found guilty, it is somewhat alarming that article 13 (2)(a) of the agreement contemplates
the possibility of transferring the trial to Scotland. This is said to take place only when the
two accused give their written consent in open court and in the presence of their legal
representatives. An examination of the joint letter to the Security Council, in contrast to
this, reveals that such option has no place. The Lord Advocate mentioned in a public
statement that it would be an absolute requirement for the trial in The Hague that his
officials "would not negotiate, directly or indirectly, with the accused persons or the Government which allegedly employed them as to the kind of trial which they would find
appropriate.""
It is submitted that the apparent contradiction between the terms of the agreement and
the contents of the public statement made by the Lord Advocate needs clarification before
the trial proper can begin.
IV. Extradition under the Montreal Convention of 1971
A.

CONCURRENT JURISDICTIONS

Article 7 of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 pertinently provides:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does
not extradite him, be obliged to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution.
This provision is clearly intended to incorporate the principle of dedere autjudicare,which
ensures that any person or persons charged with the offense of aircraft sabotage should be
brought to justice. 19 The accused persons in the Lockerbie case have neither been prosecuted in Libya nor extradited to the United States or the United Kingdom. So far, all
attempts to resolve this impasse have proved to be in vain. There are, of course, a number
of factors that led to that, chief among them being the apparent conflict of jurisdiction that
arises from article 5 of the Montreal Convention. Under that provision, the right to exercise
jurisdiction is accorded to the United Kingdom on the basis that it is the country of the
locus of the offense (article 5(1)(a)). Jurisdiction is also granted to the United States, as the
offense was committed against or aboard the Boeing 747 aircraft that was registered in that
country (article (5)(1)(b)). Finally, jurisdiction to prosecute is also bestowed upon Libya
because the alleged offenders are present in its territory and it has elected to prosecute
rather than to extradite them to the United States or the United Kingdom (article (5)(2)).

18. Copy provided by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London) in August 1998.
19. See generally The Genocide Convention of 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention on the International
Maritime Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 85, 135, 287; Convention on Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14,1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered
into force Oct. 14,1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of CivilAviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973); European Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorism, Dec. 4,1979, 19 .L.M. 325; OMER Y. ELAGAB,INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO TERRORISM 104 (1995).
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The fact that all three parties to the dispute have claimed jurisdiction over the accused
produces a rather problematic situation. This is mainly due to the fact that article 5(3) of
the Montreal Convention does not establish a hierarchical system of jurisdiction when more
than one contracting party has a basis for such a claim. An examination of the negotiating
history of the convention reveals that a proposal for giving such a priority to the state of
registration of the aircraft was rejected. 0 It is interesting to note that in the course of the
oral hearings in the Lockerbie case before the ICJ, all the parties concerned recognized
that the convention is silent on the matter of priority and exclusivity of jurisdiction.2 A
perplexing question to be addressed is whether Libya's discharge of an article 7 duty by
prosecuting rather than extraditing puts on hold the claims raised by the U.K. and U.S.
governments for exercising jurisdiction. Prima facie, the answer seems to be in the affirmative, as it appears to be a reflection of the law on terrorism as it has been expounded on
in the convention. Moreover, it could not have been the intention of the contracting parties
to include a provision in the convention that is blatantly inconsistent with the generally
recognized rule against "double jeopardy." There is also room for the view that commencement of the trial is hampered by the refusal of the U.K. and U.S. governments to make
evidence available to the Libyan judiciary that should absolve Libya from the obligation to
prosecute. On the other hand, it is arguable that if Libya is shown to be unwilling or unable
to extradite or prosecute the alleged offenders, the claims for jurisdiction by the contending
states would be activated. This will be consonant with the principle ofautdedereautjudicare,
which means either surrenderor prosecute, which is enshrined in the convention.
At a different level, if Libya reverses its present stance regarding the option of extradition,
a question will arise as to which of the two claimant states the accused should be extradited.
Furthermore, does that decision lie with Libya alone, as the custody state? The convention
does not address these issues specifically, but as a matter of common sense the choice as to
trial in Scotland or the United States, in the absence of agreement between the parties is
one that rests solely with the Libyan Government. The Lord Advocate of Scotland accepts
this formula, adding that: "[The] choice causes no difficulty whatsoever to the United Kingdom in view of the fact that both of these countries have jurisdiction in international law
and this case has from a very early stage, been investigated, pursued in full co-operation
between the United Kingdom and the United States."22
B.

EXTRADITION ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE MONTREAL CONVENTION

Article 8 of the Montreal Convention has set up a regime for extraditing persons allegedly
guilty of offenses relating to aircraft sabotage. This next section examines each of its four
paragraphs separately and shows how each of them relates to the Lockerbie incident.
1. Issues Raised in Article 8, Paragraph(1)
"The offenses shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition
treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States undertake to include the
offenses as extraditable offenses in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them."

20. InternationalConference on Air Law, para. 49, at 58, ICAO Doc. 9081-LC/170-1 (1971).
21. Oral Hearings on Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.CJ. 60 (Mar. 27); 1992
I.C.J. 41 (Mar. 28); 1992 I.C.J. 46 (Mar. 28); 1992 I.C.J. 19 (Mar. 28).
22. Hardie, supra note 1.
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First, it is evidently clear from this provision that aircraft sabotage is an extraditable
offense, which is deemed to be automatically incorporated in existing extradition treaties.
Second, under this provision, the contracting parties to the Montreal Convention have
included the offense of aircraft sabotage in all future extradition treaties between them. It
can, therefore, be stated that article 8(1) addresses two distinct situations; the first presupposes the existence of extradition treaties between the parties; and the second obligates
contracting states to include the offense of aircraft sabotage in all future extradition treaties
between them. It follows, therefore, that little can be gained from invoking the provisions
of that paragraph to the jurisdiction question in the Lockerbie case. There are two reasons
for this conclusion, namely, that no treaties existed between either or both of the two
claimants and Libya prior to the adoption of the Montreal Convention and no such treaties
have been concluded between the parties since then. The inescapable conclusion is that
under article 8(1), Libya is under no obligation whatsoever to extradite the alleged perpetrators. This view is apparently supported by five ICJ judges in the Lockerbie case. Their
opinions were expressed in a Joint Declaration, which pertinently read as follows: "Article
8(l) of the Montreal Convention... did not prohibit Libya from refusing to extradite the
accused to the United Kingdom or the United States. It is implied that in the absence of
extradition Libya had to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution."
2. Issues Raised in Article 8, Paragraph(2)
"If a contracting state that makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty
receives a request for extradition from another contracting state with which it has no extradition treaty, it may, at its option, consider this convention as the legal basis for extradition with respect to the offenses. Extradition will be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested state."
Article 8, paragraph (2), provides a relatively efficacious means for the extradition of
aircraft saboteurs, as it minimizes the excuses that may be made by states unwilling to
extradite in the absence of extradition treaties. This provision seeks to make the extradition
possible by creating a bilateral treaty between the parties in the event that the state receiving
a request to extradite an alleged offender requires an extradition treaty before it can comply
with the request.
It must be pointed out, however, that article 8(2) has two major weaknesses: (i) it entitles
the requested state ".... at its own option to consider the Convention as the legal basis for
extradition

..

."; and (ii) it subjects extradition to the municipal law of the requested state.

As concerns the first weakness, the extremely permissive nature of article 8(2) makes it
possible for the requested state to enjoy a wide margin of discretion as to whether it wishes
to accept the convention as the juridical basis for extradition or not. Regarding the second
weakness, by subjecting extradition to the municipal laws of the requested state, the paragraph relegates the convention to a status that is inferior to the municipal laws of the state
in question.
Since Libya requires extradition treaties between itself and the United Kingdom and the
United States, it was open to it to regard the convention as a bilateral treaty between the
three parties concerned and to extradite the accused on that basis. This, of course, did not
happen. It seems that Libya exercised the option available to it under that provision by
choosing not to regard the Montreal Convention as the legal basis for extradition because
the accused were Libyan nationals and because Libyan law did not allow extradition of
SPRING 2000
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nationals. 23 Pertinent to this point are the views expressed by Judge Bedjaoui in his dissenting opinion in the Lockerbie case: "I would point out, that, as is well known, there
does not exist in international law any rule that prohibits, or, on the contrary imposes the
extradition of nationals."24
These remarks seem to be consistent with the preponderance of authorities. 21 It is arguable, therefore, that Libya cannot insist on refusing to extradite the accused men merely
because they are Libyan nationals if all the conditions envisaged in article 8 are met. In any
event, Libya has repeatedly insisted that the nationality of the accused is only one of the
factors that militates against their extradition, and that its refusal to extradite is primarily
based on the absence of an extradition treaty between itself and the other parties to the
dispute.
Interestingly, Professor Higgins, on the United Kingdom's behalf in the Lockerbie case,
asserted to the ICJ:
Article 8(2) ... provides a mechanism by which extradition may be affected, if the State concerned wish to make use of it. The United Kingdom has not, however, sought the extradition
of the two accused under Article 8(2)-indeed, it has not sought their extradition (in the
technical sense of the term) at all-but has instead maintained that Libya should, for reasons
6
unrelated to the Montreal Convention, surrender the two accused.1
Although it is self-evident from the above remarks that counsel for the United Kingdom
did not fully develop her arguments, these remarks may nevertheless convey that the U.K.
government had conceded that Libya would not be required under the Montreal Convention to extradite the two accused. 7
3. Issues Raised in Article 8, Paragraph(3)
"Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a
treaty shall recognize the offenses as extraditable offenses between themselves subject to
the conditions provided by the law of the requested State."2
The first thing to note about the above provision is that, unlike paragraph (2) of the same
article where permissive language is used, it adopts mandatory language. This is evident
from the phrase "shall recognize" as opposed to "may at its option." This apparent difference is blurred by subjecting both provisions to "the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State."
Paragraph (3) addresses the situation in which the requested state does not insist on the
existence of a treaty as a prerequisite to extradition. It is with regard to such a state that it
imposes an obligation to recognize aircraft sabotage as an extraditable offense. In applying
paragraph (3) to the situation arising from the Lockerbie incident, arguably, Libya would
have been under a legal obligation to surrender the accused but for the fact that it makes
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty.

23. See Oral Hearings, supra note 21, at 71.
24. Lockerbie, supra note 6, para. 12, at 148.
25. See,e.g.,I OPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 955-56 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 478 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980).
26. Oral Hearings, supra note 21, at 17.
27. See Shubber, supra note 2.
28. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
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4. Issues Raised in Article 8, Paragraph(4)
"Each of the offenses shall be treated for the purpose of extradition between Contracting
States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it occurred but also in
the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with Article
5, paragraph 1(b), (c) and (d)." 29
Article 8(4) deals with the question of what state is regarded as the place where aircraft
sabotage is committed. It provides that the offense is to be treated as having occurred not
only in the territory of the state in which it is committed, but also in the territories of the
states of registration of the aircraft, the state where the aircraft lands with the alleged
offender still on board, and the state where the lessee of the aircraft has his principal place
of business or his permanent residence.
Despite the ease with which this provision extends jurisdiction over the accused to the
United States and the United Kingdom, it would not be possible for these two states to
rely on it as a basis for extradition in the particular circumstances of the Lockerbie case, as
Libya has already claimed jurisdiction. All that the United Kingdom and the United States
can do is to continue claiming jurisdiction over the accused until such time, if at all, Libya
renounces its own claim.
V. Forfeiting the Option Not to Extradite Due
to the Complicity of the State in Terrorist Acts
Although the Montreal Convention gives the state of custody the option of extraditing
or prosecuting those accused of aircraft sabotage as required by the principle aut dedere aut
judicare,this hardly applies where the perpetrator acts on the state's instructions. One could
imagine that the complicitous state would want to circumvent being exposed by opting to
prosecute the perpetrator in its own courts rather than hand him over. Obviously, this
cannot be a satisfactory solution.
In the context of the Lockerbie case, even if Libya's complicity in the explosion that
caused the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 is established, it would seem that Libya could
nevertheless hold the trials of the two men in its own courts without acting in breach of
the Montreal Convention. It must, however, be emphasized that such an approach should
not absolve Libya of state responsibility if its culpability is established according to normal
standards. In such a situation, Libya would have to offer an apology, make reparations,
punish the individuals responsible for the crime, and possibly provide guarantees that it
would not repeat the unlawful conduct.30
The question to be addressed, however, is whether there are exceptional circumstances
in which the option of prosecution should be denied to the state that is complicitous in acts
of terrorism. A proposition relevant to this has been raised by the governments of the
United Kingdom and the United States. 3 It provides that where the state of custody is in
connivance with the accused vis-a-vis some terrorist act, it forfeits its right to prosecute.
As a consequence, the only option open for that state would be to extradite the accused.

29. Id. art. 8, para. 4.
30. A discussion of state responsibility as pertains to the Lockerbie dispute will be pursued in a subsequent
article by the present author.
31. (The Lockerbie Case,) For remarks by counsel for the United Kingdom, see Oral Hearings, CR92/3
(Mar. 26, 1991) at 22; for remarks by counsel for the United States, see Oral Hearings CR92/4 (Mar. 27, 1991)
at 61-62.
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In specific terms, both the U.K. and the U.S. governments have consistently alleged that
Libya was in league with the accused persons. Furthermore, they assert that any trial of the
two men in Libyan courts will not, by the nature of the situation, be genuine or meet the
demands of justice. 2 A significant question that arises from this assertion is whether there
are legal means other than the Montreal Convention that can be invoked for handing over
the accused for trial in U.K. or U.S. courts.
As a starting point, it is a prerequisite of any such attempt that the alleged complicity of
Libya in the terrorists' act, which led to the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft and the
ensuing deaths, must be established. Only if that hurdle is passed then, as a matter of
international legal policy, the perpetrators should not go unpunished simply because there
is a gap in the convention that stands in the way of achieving that result. Accordingly, the
focus must shift to other possible rules of international law that can form the legal basis for
extraditing the accused for trial in U.K. or U.S. courts.
Consideration may first be given to general international law other than treaty law. In
doing so, we immediately encounter an unchallenged rule that provides that no state is
bound to extradite in the absence of an express treaty obligation. The leading authorities
in the United Kingdom and the United States recognize this principle." It is also cited with
4
approval in the jurisprudence of the U.S. courts.
A "Joint Declaration" in the Lockerbie case by Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume,
and Aguilar Mawdsley provides an authoritative statement on extradition under general
international law. It reads as follows:
In so far as general international law is concerned, extradition is a sovereign decision of the
requested State, which is never under an obligation to carry it out. Moreover, in general
international law there is no obligation to prosecute in default of extradition. Although since
the days of Covarruvias and Grotius such a formula has been advocated by some legal scholars,
it has never been part of positive law. This being so, every State is at liberty to request extradition and every State is free to refuse it."
As can be seen from the above passage, Libya is clearly under no obligation whatsoever to
extradite or prosecute the accused under general international law.
In the course of the Lockerbie proceedings before the ICJ, counsel for the United King-

dom stated that "the United Kingdom has not, however, sought the extradition of the two
accused under Article 8(2)-indeed it has not sought their extradition in the technical sense
of the term at all."36 These remarks suggest that the legal basis contemplated for handing
over the accused is completely outside the ambit of the Montreal Convention." If this is
the case, we need to see whether the international community has recognized terrorism as
one of the special categories of criminal offenses that are abhorrent to mankind. In short,

32. SeeG.A. Doc. A/46/826 (Dec. 20, 1991); U.N. Doc. A/46/825-S/23306 (Dec. 31, 1991); U.N. Doc.
A/46/826-S/23307 (Dec. 31, 1991).
33. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 948-50; MARJORIE W. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 732-33 (1968).

34. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (D. Fla. 1959).
35. Joint Declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar Mawdsley, 1992 I.C.J. 136
(Apr. 14), para. 2.
36. Oral Hearings, supra note 21, at 48.
37. SeeShubber, supra note 2, at 262 n.89.
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we need to ascertain whether a customary law rule exists that obligates a complicitous state
to extradite rather than to surrender.
Pertinent to the question under review is General Assembly Resolution 49/60, which
8
annexed to it the "Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism."" The
objective of the declaration is to enhance the struggle against acts of international terrorism,
including those that directly or indirectly involve states. The declaration seeks to commend
all the efforts that have been made so far, and urges states to form closer links and exchange
information with one another in combating terrorism. More significantly, however, it calls
upon states to "review urgently the scope of the existing international legal provisions on
the prevention, repression and elimination of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
with the aim of ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal framework covering all aspects
of the matter."3 9 And finally, the declaration calls upon states to discharge the obligations
of ensuring "the apprehension and prosecution of terrorist acts in accordance with the
relevant provisions of their national law."4°
As concerns the normative value of Resolution 49/60 and the declaration annexed to it,
resolutions relating to legal questions in the General Assembly of the United Nations are
regarded as a material source of custom.

4

I

The legal significance of each resolution, how-

ever, will depend on the subsequent state practice relating to it. In any event, there are two
alternative routes through which General Assembly Resolutions may attain the status of
"Law Making" Resolutions: first, whether the resolution in question is declaratory of existing law; and, second, whether that resolution formed the basis for progressive development of law. In applying this to Resolution 49/60 and the declaration annexed thereto,
hardly any evidence of existing international customary law relating to terrorism exists that
can justify a claim that these instruments have merely reduced it to written form. As concerns the second route, i.e., "progressive development of law," it needs to be spelled out at
the outset that the adoption of Resolution 49/60 and the declaration without a vote does
not give them the force of law. They must comply with the two essential elements of custom
stated in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ, namely, state practice and opiniojuris.
Thus, by being part of a series of similar instruments, this suggests uniformity in the opinions of governments. Moreover, since Resolution 49/60 and its predecessors are in line with
the ten great conventions concerning the elimination of international terrorism, they may
reflect opiniojuris2 supporting a rule against terrorism. In the context of the Lockerbie case,
since the United Kingdom and the United States are the claimant states, they bear the
burden of proof with regard to the existence of a customary law rule against terrorism on
the basis of General Assembly Resolutions. The United Kingdom and the United States as
claimant states would face an uphill task in discharging the burden of proof as there is no
state practice to be relied on.
VI. Limitations on Extradition Derived from Fundamental
Human Rights
The fascinating question of whether human rights considerations preclude surrender of
the accused, even if an obligation to do so exists in principle, will be addressed in this part
38. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Sixth Committee, General Assembly, 49th
Sess., Agenda Item 142, at 4, G.A. Res. 490, U.N. Doc. A/49/743, at 4 (1994).
39. Id. at 7.
40. Id.
41. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (4th ed. 1990).

42. See the Asylum Case, 1950 I.CJ. 266; the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.CJ. 44.
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of the article. This will entail an assessment of whether a fair trial is virtually impossible
due to the fact that the British and American governments have prejudged the guilt of the
accused.
A.

THE NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS

The last five decades in this century have witnessed a significant development in human
rights in the international arena. Issues of liberty, which used to be within the exclusive
domain of the state as a matter of sovereignty, are now regulated by international rules. In
the context of extradition, the surrender of a fugitive is no longer a matter to be exclusively
determined by the relation between the requesting and the requested states alone; principles
of fundamental human rights, which form a part of general international law, dictate that
it should be allowed subject to certain limitations. 41 Pertinent to the issue under review is
the stance taken by the Institut de Droit International in its Resolution on new problems
of extradition at the Cambridge session in 1983. The rapporteur of the commission dealing
with extradition suggests that if extradition would result in "the violation of human rights
even though the individual was himself accused of violating human rights then [it] should
not be granted." 44 Moreover, the rapporteur took the view that "it would not be an exaggeration to state that the protection that this basic human position justified might prevail
over treaties as a norm ofjus cogens.''4 Be that as it may, article IV of the resolution adopted
by the Institut de Droit International deals with the question under review in the following
manner:
The Protection of the Fundamental Rights of the Human Person-

In cases where there is a well-founded fear of the violation of the fundamental human rights
of an accused in the territory of the requesting State, extradition may be refused, whosoever
the individual whose extradition is requested and whatever the nature of the offence of which
he is accused. 4

The resolution shows clearly the importance the members of the Institut attach to the
protection of the human rights of the person whose extradition is being sought, irrespective
of the gravity of the offense committed by that person. Although the term ' jus cogens" was
not adopted in the text of article IV, it seems to be implicitly included.
B.

THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS A LIMITATION ON SURRENDER

The circumstances under which extradition takes place must conform to fundamental
human rights. The European Court of Human Rights recognized this in the Soering Case. 41
Similarly, the "Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States"
to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1975 provided that in the field of human
rights and fundamental freedoms the participating states should fulfill their obligations as
set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including the Inter-

43. See IVAN A. SHEARER,EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1971);J.H.W.
LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1972); GUILLAUME, 215 HAGUE RECUEIL 363-64.

44. 1983
45. Id.

ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 219.

46. Id.
47. Soeringv. U.K., 161 EHRR 439 (1989).
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national Covenants on Human Rights. Itmay be mentioned briefly, for the sake of clarity,
that article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that
"everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.''48Moreover, "everyone charged with a criminal of4'
fence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
In addition, basic human rights standards are the subject of erga omnes obligation as indicated by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case. 0
Emerging is the requirement of a fair trial as a fundamental human right that must be a
prerequisite of extradition. As concerns the Lockerbie case, a serious question to be addressed is whether the two accused would be able to receive a fair trial, either in the United
States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. Libya pleaded before the ICJ that in the
circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of a fair trial for at least three reasons:
First, the resort to extensive propaganda and news management which characterized the
publication of the indictment and developments thereafter;
Secondly, particularly in the American context, the pervasive anti-Arab propaganda and
attitudes of the media towards Arabs and Arab States.
Thirdly, the persistent use of language in official statement which involves assumptions
of the guilt of the accused persons and which asserts that "Libyan officials" were responsible
for the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft.
These remarks were well received by Judge El-Kosheri, who expressed a similar sentiment in his dissenting judgment in the Lockerbie case. In his view, the extraordinary impact
of the mass media and the role it played would render it impossible for the two Libyan
suspects to receive a fair trial by jury either in the United States or in the United Kingdom.5 '
Judge Shahabuddeen noted in his separate opinion that the formal demand of the United
States and the United Kingdom on November 27, 1991, asking Libya to pay appropriate
compensation promptly (and, therefore, prior to conducting any trial) would inevitably lead
to an impartial trial. In his view, such a demand constituted a public and widely publicized
announcement by the United States and the 2United Kingdom as states that the two accused
were in fact guilty of the offenses charged.1
Judge Ajibola expressed similar concerns in his dissenting judgment with reference to
the demands made of Libya to pay compensation prior to a finding of guilt by a competent
court. He remarked that, "The presumption of innocence until guilt is established is still
an integral part of the due administration of criminal justice the world over.""
Judge Bedjaoui maintained that Libya had the right to protect the accused from any
4
"hasty judgments of public opinion or the mass media."1
The case of Patrick Ryan serves as a reminder that outright condemnation of the accused
by senior officers and the media will militate against extraditing that person, as an impartial
trial can no longer be guaranteed under such circumstances. It should be recalled that the

48.
(1967).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368
Id. para. 2.
1970 I.CJ. 32 (Feb. 5).
1992 I.CJ. 216 (Apr. 14), paras. 61-2.
Id. at 141, para. (ii).
Id. at 191.
Id. at 148, para. 11.
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Irish Attorney-General refused to extradite Ryan because there was such an outcry in the
United Kingdom that it was impossible to guarantee a fair trial. There appears to be some
analogy between Ryan's case and the case at hand.
As hitherto mentioned, a proposition has been put forward to the effect that a fair trial
is precluded because British and American governments have prejudiced the guilt of the
two Libyans. This is probably true in the trivial sense that the British and American governments are clearly acting in the interest of the prosecution process. But the important
question is whether courts in the United States and Britain (including a Scottish court in
the Netherlands) have prejudged the guilt of the accused, rather than whether the governments in question have. This is precisely what the Solicitor-General for Scotland submitted
in the course of the Lockerbie hearing before the International Court ofJustice."1 But the
issue needs to be confronted more squarely in order to determine the situation one way or
the other. To begin with, the British and American governments made certain statements,
respectively in the House of Commons and Congress, and in the United Nations Security
Council. These statements carried with them an assumption of inference of guilt on the
part of the two Libyans named in the warrants issued by Scottish and American courts.
Furthermore, the media widely and fully reported aforesaid statements over a protracted
period. The big question is whether this escalation elevated the case to a unique status that
could only have intensified the impact and lasting effect on members of the public of what
had been disseminated by the media.
It must be emphasized that any answer to this question must essentially be one of speculation. After careful assessment, however, the writer is of the opinion that by prejudicing
the guilt of the accused, the British and American governments have significantly diminished the prospect of a fair trial.
Similar concerns may be expressed with respect to whether the British and American
prosecutors have precluded a fair trial because they may be said to have prejudged the guilt
of the two Libyans they have indicted. But it would be very naive to draw any inference
from the fact that American and British prosecutors are acting "nonimpartially" in the trivial
sense of insisting on bringing the two men to trial either in U.S. or Scottish courts. For
any concerns to be justified, however, it would have to be established that prosecution
agencies in the claimant states are not impartial in a very significant way that is likely to
result in a miscarriage of justice.
There are two observations to be made: first, article 11(1) of the Montreal Convention
stipulates that "contracting states shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance
in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offence."56 Libya asserts
that pursuant to this provision, it requested British and American prosecuting authorities
to supply copies of the evidence at their disposal, but they refused to do so.57 The ground
for this refusal was said to be that article 11 (1) would apply only when the venue of the trial
had been settled. The writer believes that such a refusal could constitute an impediment to
a fair trial in British or American courts wherever constituted. What is more serious, however, is the stream of adverse remarks made by successive Lord Advocates vis-a-vis Libyan
authorities. For example, the Lord Advocate recently described the commitment made by

55. Oral Hearings (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), supra note 21, at 14-15.
56. Montreal Convention, supra note 28, art. 11,para. 1.
57. Id. at 50, 52 and 71.
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the Libyan leader to President Nelson Mandela, that Libya would put no obstacles in the
path of surrendering the accused for trial in a neutral country, as representing "a continuous
and patent prevarication by Libya."58 It is submitted that the form in which such remarks
are made could conceivably lead the public to believe that their official source would possess
irrefutable evidence that could conclusively establish the guilt of the accused. Such views
will undoubtedly put constraints on a fair trial, whether in British or American courts. This
is also bound to influence the minds of the Scottish judges who sit in the proposed court
in the Netherlands. This is likely to be the case as these judges, in the absence of a jury,
will assume the role of the jury, a task for which they are neither prepared, nor received
any form of training. Thus, all of a sudden and completely on an experimental basis, the
judges will be required to assume the dual roles of judges and jurors.
To conclude, there is overwhelming evidence that the American and British governments,
along with their respective prosecution services, have prejudged the guilt of the accused in
a significant way. Additionally, the case has already received unprecedented publicity in the
media and would undoubtedly generate further publicity if the proposed trial begins in The
Hague. Under the circumstances, it would be impossible to find a panel of Scottish judges
who would be unaffected or uninfluenced by the pre-trial publicity. It must be emphasized
that the legal training of the Scottish judges, sitting in The Hague without a jury, no matter
how properly trained, can never make them eminently qualified to be arbiters of facts in
the case against the accused. That being so, it is submitted that the right to a fair trial,
which is a fundamental principle of human rights, would be compromised if the accused
were to be tried in U.S. or U.K. courts (including a Scottish court sitting in The Hague).
VIII. Conclusion
There are serious contradictions in the documents that the U.K. and U.S. governments
submitted to the Security Council with regard to the guarantees offered to the accused and
the witnesses should the trial go ahead in The Hague. They should be ironed out at once;
otherwise, there is a serious risk of the trial not being held in the Netherlands.
The jurisdictional regime created by the 1971 Montreal Convention provides for several
jurisdictions, but does not specify a hierarchal order as to which jurisdiction prevails in case
of conflict. This apparent conflict has led the United Kingdom, the United States and Libya
to lodge concurrent claims with respect to jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrators in the
Lockerbie incident.
Nevertheless, once Libya has asserted jurisdiction as the contracting state where the
alleged perpetrators are found, it is not inconsistent with the purpose and object of the
Montreal Convention for the United Kingdom and the United States to hold their respective claims for jurisdiction in abeyance. This state of affairs will persist until Libya is shown
to be unwilling or unable to conduct the trials.
If Libya's failure to hold the trials in its own courts is primarily attributable to the recalcitrance on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States to release the evidence
necessary for the prosecution that is allegedly in their possession, arguably, Libya can be
said to have discharged its obligation under the convention.

58. Lord Advocate of Scotland, The Lockerbie Trial, ScoTs L. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at 10.
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As the extradition arrangements under the Montreal Convention are not obligatory, and
subject to numerous qualifications, Libya's persistence not to extradite its accused nationals
is defensible under that convention.
Neither the Montreal Convention nor general international law divest a contracting state
of exercising the option to prosecute rather than to extradite persons accused of committing
terrorist acts, even if that state was complicitous in the terrorist acts.
Efforts in the General Assembly to eliminate terrorism (including state-sponsored terrorism) have not crystallized into customary international law. Thus, even if Libya's complicity in the terrorist act in question is established, its failure to surrender the two men to
the claimant states does not violate customary international law. This is a reflection of the
fact that there is presently no customary law on terrorism.
Furthermore, since it is unlikely that the accused will have the assurance of a fair trial
due to the media coverage, this creates an independent bar to extradition.
It is self-evident from these conclusions that the regime established by the convention is
suffering from serious defects that were not apparent when it was concluded some twentyseven years ago. The Lockerbie incident is unfortunately a timely reminder that the convention is in need of some repairs by way of an additional protocol. Among the issues that
need special focus are
(i) priority and exclusivity of jurisdiction;
(ii) whether a state that is complicitous in a terrorist act should be denied the right to
prosecute; and
(iii) how to resolve the issue when a fair trial within any given jurisdiction is not possible.
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